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I. Introduction
Today's report shows the nation's broadband success story. The
President's policies have made a significant impact on the
availability and affordability of broadband in the United
States .... The broadband policies put in place by the President
have created a competitive environment to foster innovation and
provide effective technologies, services and cost-effective
solutions to revolutionize health care delivery, education, society
and the economy. We look forward to continuing our progress on
this issue.
U.S. Secretary of Commerce Carlos M. Gutierrez, January 31, 2008.'
*Ph.D. Candidate, College of Communications, The Pennsylvania State University
1. See Press Release, National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
Gutierrez Hails Dramatic U.S. Broadband Growth, Jan. 31, 2008,
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/press/2008/NetworkedNation_013108.html (last visited Feb.
19, 2009). Here Gutierrez was referencing a 2004 mandate by President George W. Bush to
make broadband available to all American citizens. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
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In 2007, the Center for Public Integrity ("CPI") brought suit against
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") for its refusal to grant a
Freedom of Information Act request. The CPI sought disclosure of
information that broadband providers furnishes to the FCC about their
service offerings, which the FCC uses when compiling controversial
statistics about broadband availability by zip code across the United States.
The FCC refused to disclose the requested information, citing Exemption
4-protection of trade secrets-of the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA"). The agency made this decision under the rationale that
disclosing the information would cause competitive harm for the private
companies from which it collects such information. The District Court of
the District of Columbia ultimately denied the CPI's motion for a
reconsideration of the FCC's denial under FOIA Exemption 4.2
The accuracy and viability of the FCC's methodologies for measuring
broadband deployment, and the agency's pronouncements about what those
statistics mean for consumers, have been well covered in the peer-reviewed
literature, and often in a critical light.3 Much less discussed has been the
non-transparency of the information that the FCC compiles before
announcing its broadband deployment statistics-incoming data supplied
by private telecommunications companies.
This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing why this
incoming data should be made transparent to the public, and argues that the
court's ruling in favor of the FCC's use of FOIA Exemption 4 to withhold
the information sought by the Center for Public Integrity was in error. The
court and the FCC erred in characterizing the information in question as
"trade secrets," and in its ruling the court failed to consider important
precedents in the jurisprudence of FOIA Exemption 4. Those precedents
should have been applied to the unique situation of the FCC's broadband
The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is an agency within
the Department of Commerce that advises the Executive Branch on telecommunications policy
for economic and technological development. See National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, About the NTIA, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/about.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
2. Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n., 515 F.Supp.2d 167, 170 (D.D.C.
2007).
3. See e.g. Glenn T. Inanaga, Narrowing Broadened Choices: AT&T's Monopoly over the
Future of the Internet. 10 C. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 133 (2000); Allen S. Hammond, The FCC's
Third Report on Broadband Deployment: Inequitable, Untimely and Unreasonable, 24 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 539 (2002); Andrew D. Ketter, The Narrow Choice of Broadband Providers
for Consumers: Competition and Local Regulation, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 211 (2002); Nirali Patel,
FCC Broadband Policy: More Power for the Bell Monopolies, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 393 (2003);
Tramanh Phi, Duopolies, Restrictions, and Content Regulation: How Much Access Are We Really
Getting from Broadband Internet Access?, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347 (2007).
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deployment statistics, in which telecommunications companies have
furnished information to the government voluntarily (in part), while that
information is then used to promote the supposed success and advancement
of an infrastructure that could potentially benefit all Americans.
The next section of this paper explores the controversies surrounding
the FCC's zip code-based broadband availability statistics, and the
American government's pattern of promoting statistical results that are
based on heavily criticized measurement methodologies. The third section
discusses in detail the legal battle between the Center for Public Integrity
and the FCC over the effort to make company-supplied broadband
deployment information more transparent. The fourth section covers
important judicial precedents relating to FOIA Exemption 4 and why the
court erred in not applying those precedents to the CPI case. The paper
then concludes with a discussion of the viability and believability of the
FCC's promotion of the American broadband network, when such
pronouncements are based on incoming information that has been
mischaracterized as "trade secrets" and incorrectly withheld from the
public.
1I. The FCC's Broadband Deployment Statistics
The deployment of broadband 4 access to American consumers became
a matter of federal policy in the Clinton administration in the 1990s,
5
during which Vice President Al Gore took the lead on telecommunications
policy and pursued a personal interest in the development of broadband. At
that time, broadband was promising vast improvements in information
access and distribution over then-predominant dial-up access. 6 Gore added
4. The term "broadband" refers to the capacity to transmit signals (in the form of voice,
video, or data) at higher speeds and with greater quality than the preceding technology,
narrowband. In wired communications, broadband is usually enabled by coaxial or fiber-optic
cables. Wireless broadband is also made possible through microwave transmissions. See Federal
Communications Commission, Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau: Getting Broadband,
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfactslhighspeedinternet.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). From
1999 to 2008, the FCC also defined "broadband" as 200 kbps download or upload speed. See
infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
5. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, formulated during the Clinton administration,
requires the FCC to determine if advanced telecommunications capability (under which
"broadband" is typically categorized) is being deployed in a "reasonable and timely" fashion. See
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 706(b) (1996)).
6. See Bob Davis, On Broadband Future, Gore and Bush Offer Crucial Differences, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 24, 2000, at Al Gore's personal interest in the topic of internet access is well known,
and he probably coined the term "information superhighway" in 1990, when as senator from
Tennessee he introduced a bill that would have mandated federal government involvement in the
2009]
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the topic of broadband deployment to his 2000 presidential campaign, and
hinted that his administration would encourage increased Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") regulations and subsidies to cable
and telephone firms in a national effort to make broadband-speed access to
the information superhighway available to everyone.7 Gore's opponent
George W. Bush, the eventual victor in the 2000 presidential election, did
not make a commitment to the issue during the election season, though his
campaign advisors and future members of his administration did study
market-based and non-regulatory approaches to the issue of broadband
deployment.8
As president, by 2002 Bush had adopted broadband deployment as an
economic priority, and early that year FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell
began an intensive investigation into all existing regulations that affected
broadband deployment.9  The catalysts for nationwide broadband
deployment during the Bush administration were to be market-driven
processes, not government regulations.' ° As early as the summer of 2002,
the administration considered formulating an enforceable national
broadband deployment policy." However, the only true developments
during this period were statements from the administration that Bush would
creation of educational software. Gore's later statements on his internet policy interests gave nse
to a myth that he claimed to have invented the Internet, a statement he never made but the legend
of which is often used by his political opponents and detractors. See Declan McCullagh, No
Credit Where It's Due, WIRED, Mar. 11, 1999, http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/03
/18390 (last visited Feb. 19, 2009); Robert Parry, He's No Pinocchio: How the Press has
Exaggerated Al Gore's Exaggerations, WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 2000,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2000/0004.parry.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
7. See Davis, supra note 6.
8. Id.
9. See Jonathan Krim, Does Fast Internet Need a Push? High-Speed Access Seen as
Economic Catalyst, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2002, at Al. The push for a national policy on
broadband deployment was a bipartisan endeavor, with Democratic Senate leaders Tom Daschle
(D.-S.D.) and Joseph Lieberman (D.-Conn.) personally encouraging President Bush to add the
issue to the White House agenda. See also Mike Allen & Jonathan Krim, High-Speed Internet
Access Gets White House Spotlight, WASH. POST, June 13, 2002, at A8.
10. The acceptance of broadband deployment as a national economic priority may have
been influenced by industry lobbyists who desired assistance in boosting the broadband market,
as consumers in early 2002 were reluctant to take on the new technology or the increased costs of
broadband service in the home. Development of the broadband infrastructure was lagging as
well. See John Van, Broadband Industry Looks for Boost, CHICAGO TRIB., Jan. 31, 2002, at 3;
The Right Signal on Broadband, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at M4.
11. See Allen & Krim, supra note 9, at A8. The Bush administration demurred on
developing a policy at this time because of sharply divided opinions from industry. Id.
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promote relaxed FCC regulations toward high-speed internet service.' 2 The
vagueness of these statements inspired criticism from industry lobbyists
and consumer groups.
3
At a March 2004 speech in New Mexico during his reelection
campaign against John Kerry, Bush revived his plans for broadband
deployment as a boost to the nation's economy and pledged to deliver
affordable broadband to all American homes by 2007.14 By that point in
time, the U.S. broadband market had already fallen significantly behind
other industrialized nations, particularly those in Asia, as American
telecommunications companies had to embark on a laborious upgrade of
the country's wireline infrastructure. This upgrade was also slowed by the
reluctance of the leading firms to roll out broadband on a wide basis
without knowing beforehand how many consumers would partake of the
service; while at the time, those firms were dedicating more money to
wireless and video applications. 15  The firms also claimed regulatory
uncertainty due to the possible application of either telecommunications
service or information service regulations.'
6
Growth in the broadband market overall was stilted because the
prohibitive costs of expanding the existing telecommunications
12. See Marilyn Geewax, FCC May Ease Rules, Forum Told, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 14,
2002, at F4; Yochi J. Dreezen, Tech Firms Bemoan Bush Talk: "Broadband" Policy is Viewed as
Lacking Significant Details, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2002, at A4.
13. Id.
14. See John Van, Bush Backs Broadband Push - Timing of Comment Stirs Discussion,
CHICAGO TRIB., Mar. 27, 2004, at 1. Commentators suspected that this new announcement was
merely an election year ploy, a theory bolstered by the fact that Democratic frontrunner John
Kerry raised the issue shortly thereafter. More specifically, Bush's announcement was widely
criticized for its lack of detail on how the 2007 goal would be met. There was also no detail on
the word "affordable" and how price reductions or access for poor households would be achieved,
be it through subsidies or other means. See also Allen, Bush Sets Internet Access Goal, WASH.
POST, Mar. 27, 2004, at A4.
15. See Leslie Walker, The Promise of a Broader Superhighway, WASH. POST, Apr. 1,
2004, at El. By mid-2003, 80 percent of American homes had at least one option available for
high-speed Internet access, but only 21 percent of those homes had signed up for service. These
figures in the Walker article were compiled from a then-recent estimate by the Yankee Group, an
international technology research and consulting firm. See Yankee Group, About Us,
http://www.yankeegroup.com/about.do (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). The disparity between
availability and adoption has long been a tripping point in assessments of how well the United
States is deploying broadband. As early as 2001, FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell asserted the
government's position that the availability of broadband, rather than its adoption by consumers,
was the more useful measure of the nation's progress on broadband deployment. See Chairman
Michael K. Powell, Remarks at the National Summit on Broadband Deployment (Oct. 25, 2001),
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/PowellI2001/spmkpll0.htnl (last visited Feb. 19. 2009).
16. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 §§ 3(41), 101,
706(a) (1996).
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infrastructure had given incumbent firms inordinate control over market
entry, thus preventing robust competition. 17  Meanwhile, a significant
policy-related roadblock to greater broadband competition was the
traditional regulatory disparity between cable and telephony, as firms in
both of these industries were then entering the broadband market, and there
was also controversy over the applicability of information service
regulations.18 Experts also blamed the slow American development of
broadband on the Bush administration's failure to develop a viable national
deployment strategy,' 9 while nations with strong state deployment policies
(most notably Japan and South Korea) were able to deploy broadband at a
much faster rate and with greater technological rewards for citizens.2°
Despite this lack of a national broadband policy, and the poor state of
broadband availability and competition in America, in April 2004 the Bush
administration proclaimed that the market was developing on pace and that
America was on its way to becoming the world leader in broadband
deployment. In the words of the White House, "the Administration has a
record of comprehensive and demonstrably effective broadband initiatives
that are creating an economic and regulatory climate in which broadband
can flourish., 21 The April 2004 White House document used the FCC's zip
code-based statistics to demonstrate the reach of broadband in America.
According to the FCC's figures, at that time approximately 90 percent of
U.S. zip codes had access to at least one wired broadband offering, and 75
17. See Ketter, supra note 3, at 251-58.
18. See Patel, supra note 3, at 395-97. Note that the FCC categorizes broadband as
"advanced telecommunications capability," per the definition of that term in the 1996
Telecommunications Act. See also Federal Communications Commission, FCC Issues Report on
the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans, CC Docket No.
98-146 (Jan. 28, 1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/News_
Releases/1999/nrcc9004.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.
L. 104-104, 110, § 706(c)(1), Stat. 56 (1996).
19. An example of a more successful national broadband deployment strategy can be found
in Japan, where the government drafted a blueprint for collaboration among all stakeholders
including private firms, consumer groups, and regulators. See generally Yasu Taniwaki,
Broadband Deployment in Japan, Oct. 25, 2004, http://www.neca.org/media/taniwaki.pdf (last
visited Feb. 19, 2009).
20. See Dan Mitchell, A Broadband Beat-Down, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2005, at C5. As of
the date of Mitchell's article, Japanese consumers with broadband access enjoyed download
speeds 16 times greater than that available to American consumers, and at about half the price. It
should be noted that Japan and other nations that have rapidly deployed broadband services have
the advantage of geographic areas that are smaller and consumers that are more concentrated
spatially than in the United States.
21. See The White House, Promoting Innovation and Competitiveness: President Bush's
Technology Agenda, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/technology/economic
_policy200404/chap4.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
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percent of zip codes had access to broadband via both cable modem and
DSL (digital subscriber line).22  While these percentages appeared
impressive, the FCC's use of zip codes to measure broadband availability
for American consumers was becoming a source of great controversy.
A. Zip Code-Based Measurements of Broadband Deployment
The FCC had been measuring broadband deployment by zip code
since 2000,23 when service providers were first asked to report on FCC
Form 477 whether they offered broadband service to at least one customer
in any given zip code.24 Reporting broadband deployment in this fashion
may give the impression that George W. Bush's 2004 mandate for
nationwide broadband access was coming to fruition. In early 2008, the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration ("NTIA"),
using statistics obtained directly from the FCC, reported that by the end of
2006, broadband had reached 99 percent of the nation's zip codes, which in
turn encompassed 99 percent of the American population. There were
three or more competing providers in 91.5 percent of zip codes.25
However, commentators and telecommunications experts question the
true viability of these zip code-based measurements. The most common
criticism is that a zip code is considered to have broadband availability for
all its residents even if only one address in that zip code has been offered
access, with the assumption that availability for one resident would
22. Id.
23. See Federal Communications Commission, Local Competition and Broadband
Reporting, Report and Order, CC Docket No. 99-301 (Mar. 30, 2000) available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-00-114A1.pdf at 1 87-88 (last visited
Feb. 19, 2009).
24. For a collection of periodic reports, see Federal Communications Commission,
Statistical Reports: Local Telephone Competition and Broadband Deployment, at Zip Codes by
Number of High-Speed Service Providers, http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/comp.html (last visited
Feb. 19, 2009). The FCC has also traditionally used zip code-based measurements for the
performance of local exchange carriers in the telephony market. FCC Form 477 is tailored
specifically for the reporting of local telephone competition and broadband deployment by
telecommunications companies. For more information, see Federal Communications
Commission, Broadband: Form 477 Resources for Filers, http://www.fcc.gov/form477/ (last
visited March 25, 2009). To view a blank copy of Form 477, as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet,
see Form 477, http://www.fcc.gov/formpage.html#477 (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). The
Telecommunications Act of 1996, particularly its mandate that advanced services be deployed in
a "reasonable and timely" fashion, allows the FCC to require the completion of Form 477 by
telecommunications companies. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56 § 706(b) (1996).
25. See Gutierrez Hails Dramatic U.S. Broadband Growth, supra note 1. Recall that Bush




automatically lead to the same options for all other residents of the zip
code.26 Also, until early 2008 the FCC counted as "broadband" any service
that gave users download speeds of more than 200 kbps.27 Despite rapid
technological changes in the field, this conception of broadband speed at
the FCC had remained unchanged since 1999.28 This resulted in the
measurement of certain service offerings as "broadband" even though they
wouldn't be considered so in other nations.29  These questionable
measurement methodologies had resulted in inflated broadband deployment
figures ever since those methodologies were formulated.3°
Despite the seemingly impressive statistics indicating that almost all
of America's zip codes enjoyed broadband availability, by 2006 the United
States had fallen to 15th in the world for broadband deployment, with
service available to only 19.6 percent of residents. 31 The U.S. fared even
worse in a metric known as the Digital Opportunity Index, which measures
broadband access via eleven different variables including price, proportion
of users online, and proportion of homes with access. Here the U.S. ranked
20th in the world for 2005-2006.32 Even in areas possessing more than one
26. See Hammond, supra note 3, at 542. See also Grant Gross, FCC Approves New
Broadband Mapping Plan, IDG NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 19, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com
/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/19/AR2008031903356.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
27. Kilobytes per second.
28. In 1999 the FCC defined broadband as "the capability of supporting, in both the
provider-to-consumer (downstream) and the consumer-to-provider (upstream) directions, a speed
... in excess of 200 kilobits [sic] per second (kbps) in the last mile." See Federal
Communications Commission, Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and
Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 98-146 (Feb. 2, 1999), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/fcc99005.txt at 20 (last visited Feb. 19,
2009).
29. See Anne Broache, FCC Approves New Method for Tracking Broadband's Reach,
CNET NEWS, Mar. 19, 2008, http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9898118-7.html (last visited
Feb. 19, 2009). As of 2008, many industry experts have recommended I mbps (megabytes per
second) as the threshold for defining "broadband," while 768 kbps had been an acceptable
threshold for several years prior. See also FCC: All's Well in Broadband Land, BROADBAND
REPORTS, July 26, 2006, http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/76756 (last visited Feb. 19,
2009).
30. See Hammond, supra note 3, at 542-45.
31. This ranking was made by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry: OECD Broadband Statistics to December
2006, http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,2340,en_2649_34223_38446855___ 1_ 1,00.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2009). The OECD statistics for December 2006 were the most recent
available at the time of writing.
32. The Digital Opportunity Index is measured by the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU). See International Telecommunications Union, The Digital Opportunity Index
[31:3
available broadband service, "competition" was usually in the form of a
duopoly consisting of the independent local exchange carrier (the local
phone company) offering DSL service and the cable television company
offering cable modem service, with very little price competition and the
bundling of broadband service with other options (such as premium cable
channels) that consumers may not have desired.33
This disconnect between the availability of broadband in entire zip
codes and its adoption by actual residents was heavily criticized by FCC
Commissioner Michael J. Copps. In a 2006 op-ed piece in the Washington
Post, Copps called for an overhaul of the FCC's methodology for
measuring broadband deployment.34  Copps acknowledged that the
threshold of "broadband" speed as measured by the FCC-200 kbps-was
an outdated definition of the term, while the zip code-based penetration
statistics were too geographically diffuse to measure actual deployment of
services. 35 The lack of true competition had also stifled technological
innovation in the American broadband market, with Copps decrying the
fact that Americans were paying twice as much for one-twentieth the
download speeds available in Asia and Europe.36
B. The Politicization of Broadband Deployment Statistics
The zip code-based measurement methodology was also heavily
criticized by industry experts, with many calling for true representative
samples of a given area, rather than the FCC's method of declaring an
entire zip code to have broadband availability even if as few as one
household in the area had realistic access.37 Industry experts have noted
that telecommunications regulatory decisions are often shaped by political
goals or desired future benefits, and such regulations are not necessarily
2005/06, http://www.itu.intlITU-D/ict/doi/materialiWISRO7-chapter3.pdf at 36 (last visited Feb.
19, 2009). The Digital Opportunity Index statistics for 2005-06 were the most recent available at
the time of writing.
33. See Phi, supra note 3, at 366-68. For commentary on the state of competitiveness in
2006, see also Nate Anderson. Broadband Competition? Not So Much, ARSTECHNICA, July 12,
2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060712-7242.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
34. See Michael J. Copps, America's Internet Disconnect, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2006, at




37. See e.g. Eric Bangeman, US is a Broadband Laggard, According to FCC Commissioner,
ARs TECHNICA, Nov. 9, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20061109-8185.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2009).
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consistent with good social policy in the present. 38 The politicization of
telecommunications deployment reports is a noted phenomenon, with FCC
regulators tending to over-value immediate benefits while avoiding the
uncertainty of future technological developments, and allowing short-term
considerations to outweigh future deployment strategies.39 Consequently,
some industry experts have suspected that the FCC's broadband statistics,
and even its entire zip code-based methodology, were meant to skew
deployment results upward in order to reflect favorably on
telecommunications players that had built relationships with lawmakers in
the Bush administration.40
Experts have also detected politicization in the FCC's periodic reports
to Congress on the state of American broadband deployment, with
Republican commissioners typically proclaiming that deployment is
progressing nicely, in line with President Bush's mandate; while
Democratic commissioners, most notably the aforementioned Copps,
typically lament America's poor performance on broadband deployment as
compared to other nations.4 1 A telling example is the 2004 FCC report,
which focused on election-year political issues like economic development
for rural areas and minority constituencies, while saying little about
technological innovation.42
38. See e.g. Alfred E. Kahn, Telecommunications: The Transition from Regulation to
Antitrust, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 159, 175-86 (2004). This article deals primarily
with the specific issue of network neutrality, but the section cited offers an exemplary analysis of
politicized regulations at the FCC.
39. See e.g. Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach
to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 272-275 (2003). It should be noted that Yoo is
generally opposed to regulatory schemes and favors market-based solutions to failures in the
telecommunications sector.
40. See e.g. Scott Bradner, Continuing Deceptions, NETWORK WORLD, July 18, 2005,
http://www.networkworld.com/columnists/2005/071805bradner.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009);
FCC: All's Well in Broadband Land, supra note 29.
41. See Telecom Policy Report, FCC's Broadband Report Sets Stage for Lawmakers, BNET
BUSINESS NETWORK, Sept. 22, 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOPJR/is_/ai_
n6204022 (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
42. See generally Federal Communications Commission, Availability of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability in the United States, Fourth Report to Congress, FCC 04-208,
GN Docket No. 04-54 (Sept. 9, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public
/attachmatch/FCC-04-208Al.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). Such sentiments can be found in
the individual commissioner statements that accompany the 2004 report. The three Republican
commissioners (Chairman Michael K. Powell, Kathleen Q. Abernathy, and Kevin J. Martin) were
all pleased with the progress of broadband deployment to Americans at large and to individual
constituencies. The two Democratic Commissioners (Michael J. Copps and Jonathan S.
Adelstein) issued dissenting opinions critical of American broadband availability, in quantitative
terms and in comparison to other nations. Id. at 3-7.
THE NATIONAL BROADBAND SUCCESS STORY
Even other entities within the U.S. Government took the FCC to task
for its statistical methods. In 2006, the Government Accountability Office
("GAO") conducted its own investigation into American broadband
availability and found many flaws in the FCC's zip code-based
measurement methodologies, most notably the fact that the FCC only
measured large regions where particular subscribers had obtained
broadband access, but not the smaller localities where telecommunications
companies had actually deployed broadband infrastructure to be made
available to potential subscribers. Hence, the FCC was able to report on
broadband availability at a diffuse scale, but was unable to determine if
broadband was actually available to the majority of residences in a given
large region, especially in rural areas. a3 The controversial measurement
methodology also attracted the attention of Congress. In November 2007
the House of Representatives passed a bill known as the Broadband Census
of America Act,a which called for a drastic overhaul to the broadband
measurement methodologies used by the FCC and the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration ("NTIA"). In
September 2008 both houses of Congress passed an updated version of the
bill, known as the Broadband Data Improvement Act. This bill was signed
into law by President George W. Bush on October 10, 2008, and requires
the FCC to revise its definition of broadband, identify with more detail the
broadband options available to consumers, and revise the information
requirements to be observed by providers when they report on broadband
deployment to the FCC.45
The new statute, while largely avoiding technical specifications,
codified into law some enhancements to measurement methodology that
had been promised less formally by the FCC several months before. In a
March 19, 2008, press release, the FCC stated that it was planning to
expand the scope of broadband reporting by requiring telecommunications
43. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: BROADBAND
DEPLOYMENT IS EXTENSIVE THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES, BUT IT Is DIFFICULT TO
ASSESS THE EXTENT OF DEPLOYMENT GAPS IN RURAL AREAS, May 2006, GAO-06-426,
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06426.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). The
Government Accountability Office was established by law to support Congress in improving the
performance and accountability of the federal government. Budget and Accounting Act, Pub. L.
67-13, 42 Stat. 20 (1921). Note that the acronym "GAO" previously stood for General
Accounting Office.
44. Broadband Census of America Act of 2007, H.R. 3919, 110th Cong. (2007). This bill
passed the House of Representatives by voice vote only, and individual votes were not recorded.
This particular bill was not debated in the Senate, where discussions of a modified version of the
bill were taking place. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
45. Broadband Data Improvement Act, Pub. L. 110-385, §§ 1301-1303, 122 Stat. 4096
(2008).
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companies to report on the quantity of subscribers by census tract (typically
a geographic area more precise than an entire zip code) and improving its
measurements of wireless broadband deployment.46 The new guidelines
also reformulated the FCC definition of broadband to at least 768 kbps and
required providers to report on the speeds offered in different service
packages.47 However, the new guidelines still did not require providers to
report on their prices, reducing the price-per-byte information available to
consumers who may be lucky enough to have competing vendors from
which to choose.48
After announcing that it sought comment on broadband pricing and
availability, as well as its proposed new measurement methodologies, the
FCC couldn't resist referencing its own concurrent report showing that
"broadband services are currently being deployed to all Americans in a
reasonable and timely fashion. 49 On the day the new measurement
standards were announced, FCC Chairman Kevin Martin noted that 82
percent of the country had access to DSL service and 96 percent had access
to cable modem service. But these percentages were still based on the zip
code methodology and the old 200 kbps broadband threshold; Martin did
not mention that regardless of the accuracy of the reported percentages,
only 22 percent of Americans had actually signed up for broadband
service.5 ° Martin also did not acknowledge that of the premises receiving
46. See Federal Communications Commission, FCC Expands, Improves Broadband Data
Collection (Mar. 19, 2008) (FCC/DA# DOC-280909AI) at 1, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-280909AI.pdf (last visited Feb. 19,
2009). See also FCC Finally Realizes 200kbps is Not Broadband, BROADBAND REPORTS, Mar.
19, 2008, http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/FCC-Finally-Realizes-200kbps-is-Not-
Broadband-92792 (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
47. See Nate Anderson, FCC Overhauls Its Broadband Data as EU Points and Laughs, ARS
TECHNICA, Mar. 19, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080319-fcc-overhauls-its-
broadband-data-as-eu-points-and-laughs.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
48. See Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Federal Communications
Commission, Re: Deployment of Nationwide Broadband Data to Evaluate Reasonable and
Timely Deployment of Advanced Services to All Americans, Improvement of Wireless Broadband
Subscribership Data, and Development of Data on Interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP) Subscribership, WC Docket No. 07-38, R&O and FNPRM, Mar. 19, 2008, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-280909A3.pdf at 2 (last visited Feb. 19,
2009).
49. See Federal Communications Commission, FCC Expands, Improves Broadband Data
Collection, supra note 46, at 1. The referenced report is found at Federal Communications
Commission, Federal Communications Commission Releases Data on High-Speed Services for
Internet Access, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs -public/attachmatch/DOC-280904Al.pdf (last
visited Feb. 19, 2009). This report presents statistics as of June 30, 2007.
50. See Art Brodsky, Catching Up with the FCC, Broadband, and Competition, PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE, Mar. 21, 2008, http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1467 (last visited Feb. 19,
2009). See also Statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin, Federal Communications Commission,,
broadband service, 35 percent were businesses and institutions, and not the
residential users that are the usual focus of FCC statements on broadband
deployment.51
The Federal Communications Commission 52  and the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration 53  continue to
proclaim the success of America's broadband deployment program and the
eventual realization of President Bush's mandate of access for all citizens.
But even though critics and industry watchdogs have long been aware of
the problems with the FCC's zip code-based measurement methodology
and its outdated conception of broadband speed, one matter had largely
escaped attention until a citizens' group known as the Center for Public
Integrity54 filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the FCC. The
issue is whether the Commission's broadband deployment statistics,
regardless of their viability, are based on accurately reported information
from private telecommunications companies.
III. Center for Public Integrity v. FCC
While its outward weaknesses have been widely discussed, the FCC's
methodology for computing its broadband deployment statistics is based on
incoming information that itself comes with no guarantee of accuracy or
accountability. The FCC and the private companies that provide broadband
service to American consumers have made use of an exemption to the
Freedom of Information Act 55-the protection of trade secrets56-to
withhold this incoming statistical information from the public. This
Mar. 19, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-280909A2.pdf. (last
visited Feb. 19, 2009).
51. See Anderson, supra note 47.
52. The FCC as a whole continues to make such claims, though these represent only the
majority opinions of the commissioners. As of late 2008, Democratic Commissioners Copps and
Adelstein continue to decry the state of broadband deployment. For their statements related to the
events of Mar. 19, 2008, see e.g. Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, supra note 48;
Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, Federal Communications Commission, Mar.
19, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs~public/attachmatch/DOC-280909A4.pdf (last visited
Feb. 19, 2009).
53. Broadband policy occupies its own page at the NTIA web site, with several references
to Bush's 2004 mandate. See National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
Broadband, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/opadhome/opad-brbn.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
54. The Center for Public Integrity describes itself as "a nonprofit organization dedicated to
producing original, responsible investigative journalism on issues of public concern. The Center
is non-partisan and non-advocacy." See Center for Public Integrity, About Us,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
55. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2002).
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particular circumvention of the Freedom of Information Act inspired a
lawsuit, Center for Public Integrity v. FCC,57 in which the public interest
group was unable to improve the transparency of this fundamental building
block of the FCC's broadband deployment statistics.
Since 2003, the Center for Public Integrity ("CPI") has operated a web
site called "Media Tracker" 58 that provides a graphics-based alternative to
the zip code-based information provided by the FCC on
telecommunications availability.5 9 In 2006, the CPI sought to improve
Media Tracker's level of detail by adding information on which particular
companies offered broadband service within a given zip code, which types
of broadband service were available to consumers, and which particular
localities within a zip code were served. Finding that information of such
specificity was not available in the FCC's publicly-released broadband
statistics, on August 24, 2006, the CPI filed a FOIA request to obtain such
information from the FCC. 60  In particular, the CPI requested all
information that had been reported on FCC Form 477 by
telecommunications companies.6'
According to the CPI, the FCC did not respond to this request within
twenty business days, which is required under FOIA.62 On September 25,
2006, the group promptly filed a complaint with the District Court of the
District of Columbia, claiming a violation of FOIA by the FCC.63 The next
57. 505 F.Supp.2d 106 (D.D.C. 2007).
58. See The Center for Public Integrity, Well Connected, http://projects.publicintegrity.org
/telecom/(last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
59. The information on the Media Tracker site reconstitutes and graphically represents the
zip code-based information provided at the FCC web site (usually in the form of text-based
documents) on the availability of television, radio, cable, broadband, and newspapers. See
Federal Communications Commission, Media Bureau - CDBS, http://www.fcc.gov/mb/cdbs.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2009). The Media Tracker information on broadband availability is
reproduced from the FCC's data on local telephone competition and broadband deployment. See
Federal Communications Commission, Statistical Reports: Local Telephone Competition and
Broadband Deployment, supra note 24.
60. See The Center for Public Integrity, Req. under the Freedom of Information Act, August
24, 2006, http://projects.publicintegrity.org/docs/telecom/telecomfoia/FOIARequest.pdf (last
visited Feb. 19, 2009).
61. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (2002). When a FOIA request is denied by a government
agency, the agency must provide in writing the reason for the denial along with a notification that
the requester has the right to appeal the denial. No such information was provided to the Center
for Public Integrity by September 25, 2006. However, the exact measurement of the 20-day
response period is uncertain. See infra note 64.
63. See The Center for Public Integrity, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at
3, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. Fed. Communications Comm'n., 515 F.Supp.2d 167 (D.D.C. 2007)
(No. 06-1644) (RMC), Sept. 25, 2006, available at http://projects.publicintegrity.org/docs
/telecom/telecomfoia/0 I %20-%20Complaint.pdf. (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
day, the FCC sent a belated fax to the CPI disclosing its reasons for
denying the initial FOIA request.64 The FCC claimed that the records
requested by the CPI contained "commercially sensitive, competitive
information" and that release would cause harm to the private
telecommunications firms that submitted the requested information.65
Such concerns extended back to a data gathering order that initiated
the FCC's zip code-based broadband deployment measurements in 2000, at
which time telecommunications companies raised concerns that their
competitive interests would be damaged if the FCC made public any
information about their construction of wired infrastructure.66 The FCC
then resolved to report only aggregated information to the public and to
refrain from disclosing company-specific data.67  Hence, the FCC
determined that the information requested by the CPI fell within Exemption
4 of FOIA,68 which states that a government agency can choose to withhold
"trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential. 69
64. See Letter from Kirk S. Burgee, Associate Bureau Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau,
Federal Communications Commission, to Drew Clark, Senior Fellow and Project Manager, The
Center for Public Integrity, Sept. 26, 2006 at 2, http://projects.publicintegrity.org/docs/telecom
/telecomfoia/Response.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). The actual end of the 20-day response
period is a matter of some confusion. The CPI filed its FOIA request on August 24, 2006, and
twenty business days after that was September 22. The group then filed its claim with the court
on the following business day, September 25. However, the FCC claimed that it had not violated
the 20-day requirement, because according to its internal rules the 20-day period begins not when
the requesting party files the request with the agency at large, but when the request reaches the
FCC bureau that handles the information in question. A request made out to the FCC is first
received by the Office of the Managing Director, who then sends it to the agency's FOIA Control
Office, who in turn sends it to the appropriate internal bureau. The federal regulations governing
the FCC's compliance with FOIA codify this process, but say nothing about how long this inter-
office workflow should take. See 47 C.F.R. § 0.461. Consequently, the 20-day response period
may begin several days after the agency receives the FOIA request. See Letter from Kirk S.
Burgee at 1, n.2, referencing 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.461(e), 0.461(g). Later court documents revealed
that the FOIA request from the Center for Public Integrity did not reach the appropriate FCC
custodian of records until August 29. The September 26 response from the FCC to the CPI
actually fell within twenty business days after August 29, but not August 24. Ctr. for Pub.
Integrity v. Fed. Communications Comm'n., 505 F.Supp.2d 106, 110 (D.D.C. 2007).
65. See Letter from Kirk S. Burgee, supra note 64, at 2-3.
66. See Federal Communications Commission, Local Competition and Broadband
Reporting, Report and Order, CC Docket No. 99-301 (Mar. 30, 2000), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-00-114AI.pdf at T 87-88 (last visited
Feb. 19, 2009).
67. Id. at T 91.
68. See Letter from Kirk S. Burgee, supra note 64, at 3.
69. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2002). The FCC also claimed that some of the requested
information included personal data for company officers and employees who have submitted
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The CPI filed a FOIA administrative appeal on October 19, 2006,
asking the FCC to reconsider its denial of the original request.70 This
appeal received no response from the FCC. 71  The lawsuit Center for
Public Integrity v. Federal Communications Commission was now
underway, as the CPI concluded that it had exhausted its administrative
remedies for disclosure of the requested information under FOIA.72 On
January 8, 2007, the FCC filed a motion for summary judgment, believing
that there was no general issue of material fact that justified the CPI's
dispute with the FCC's FOIA refusal.73 Verizon, 4 AT&T,75 and the United
States Telecom Association 76 intervened in the lawsuit on the FCC's
behalf, supporting the FCC's motion for summary judgment with their own
arguments on the need to keep the requested information confidential.77
Form 477, which is protected under FOIA Exemption 6 for matters of personal privacy. See 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2002).
70. See The Center for Public Integrity, Re: Review of Freedom of Information Action,
FOIA Control No. 2006-493, October 19, 2006, available at http://projects.publicintegrity.org
/docs/telecom/telecomfoia/adminappeal.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). In this appeal the CPI
offered to reduce the scope of its request to only data that can be segregated from that which
legitimately falls under FOIA Exemptions 4 and 6.
71. The Freedom of Information Act requires that an appeal be acted upon within twenty
business days, with requirements nearly identical to those for a denial of an original request. 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii)(2002). The lack of response to the CPI's appeal by the FCC was
technically a violation of FOIA, leading the CPI to conclude that it had exhausted its
administrative remedies under that statute.
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(2002). The court agreed that the CPI had exhausted its
statutory remedies. This in turn provided the court with jurisdiction to hear the case. Center for
Public Integrity v. Federal Communications Commission, 505 F.Supp.2d 106, 110 (D.D.C. 2007).
73. See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n., 515 F.Supp.2d 167 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 06-1644) (RMC), Jan. 8, 2007,
available at http://projects.publicintegrity.org/docs/telecomtelecomfoia/09%20-
%20Def's%2OMot%20for%20Summ%2OJudg.pdf at 4 (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
74. Verizon Communications, Inc. is one of the predominant carriers in the U.S. broadband
market. See Verizon, Corporate Responsibility: Network, http://responsibility.verizon.comlhome
/results/network/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). As can be seen at the cited Web page and other
pages linked to it, Verizon has been known to promote the competitiveness of its broadband
offerings while refusing to disclose the information on which such claims have been made.
Similar behavior by the FCC inspired the lawsuit by the Center for Public Integrity.
75. AT&T Inc. is also a predominant provider of broadband service in the U.S. market. See
AT&T, Corporate Profile, http://www.att.com/gen/investor-relations?pid=5711 (last visited Feb.
19, 2009).
76. The United States Telecom Association is a trade group representing American
companies that are involved in the development of the broadband market. See USTelecom,
About USTelecom, http://www.ustelecom.org/WhoWeAre/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2009 ).
77. Center for Public Integrity v. Federal Communications Commission, 505 F.Supp.2d
106, 108 (D.D.C. 2007). The court found that the intervenors had no standing in the motion for
summary judgment, though their arguments would be considered as relevant to the facts of the
case in later phases of the suit. See Id. at 110.
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The suit came before the District Court of the District of Columbia on
August 27, 2007.78
By this point the FCC had agreed to disclose some non-private
information from the cover page of Form 477.79 This was required by D.C.
Circuit Court precedent. In a case involving U.S. Army records, the court
ruled that even if a request includes some information that can be claimed
as exempt under FOIA, the agency must still disclose any "reasonably
segregable portion" of the information after the deletion of nondisclosable
portions.8° However, this information did not significantly add to what the
Center for Public Integrity already knew about broadband deployment,
consisting mostly of what the group was already presenting graphically on
its Media Tracker web site and resembling the FCC's regular broadband
deployment reports.8 1
Given the agreement by the FCC to disclose some of the requested
information (regardless of its usefulness), the court determined that the
only matter left to consider was whether the requested information was
indeed "confidential" and eligible for the trade secrets exemption under
FOIA.82 Applying a test for the confidentiality of trade secrets established
in National Parks & Conservation Ass 'n v. Morton,83 the court decided to
award summary judgment to the FCC if disclosure of the requested
information was likely "to cause substantial harm to the competitive
position of the person from whom the information was obtained.,
84
The CPI argued that the requested information would not damage the
competitive interests of the broadband companies because such information
could already be inferred indirectly by interested persons. In effect,
deployment data for localities defined more sharply than zip codes would
simply reflect where the companies offer broadband service, which makes
the data analogous to that available in a local phone book.85 The FCC and
the intervenor companies (Verizon and AT&T) did not believe the matter
78. Id. at 106.
79. The cover page of Form 477 contains the contact information for the person who files
the form. This data can be withheld under the personal privacy provisions of FOIA Exemption 6.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2002). For more on the process for the completion of Form 477 by
telecommunications firms, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
80. Oglesby v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 79 F.3d 1172, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Non-private
information on the cover page, such as company names and high-level zip code data, was ruled to
be segregable and eligible for disclosure. Center for Public Integrity, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
81. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
82. 505 F. Supp. 2d at 112.
83. 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
84. 505 F. Supp. 2d at 112.
85. Id. at 115.
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was so simple, as localized broadband deployment information would
reveal where customers had been gained or lost, and would identify areas
where an incumbent company was having trouble penetrating a market,
thus allowing a competitor to free-ride on the incumbent's prior efforts to
upgrade that locality's broadband infrastructure. 86 Consequently, data at
this level of detail would "improve [a] competitor's ability to draw
inferences about a filer's overall financial and competitive position" and
assist competitors in "designing specific competing offers to target [an
identified] customer., 87 The key point made by the FCC and the intervenor
companies was that the CPI was incorrect in characterizing the requested
data as merely a snapshot in time, showing which companies were
providing broadband in a given area on which date. Instead, the data could
be used by competitors to find trends in broadband penetration over
extended periods, illustrating the incumbent company's long-term
deployment strategies and perhaps even its financial health.
88
The court accepted the FCC's line of argument, and ruled that the
more specific information requested by the Center for Public Integrity
would indeed cause harm to each telecommunications company's
competitive interests. Thus, under the National Parks standard the FCC's
refusal to disclose this information under FOIA Exemption 4 was
justified.89 The court finally granted summary judgment in favor of the
FCC and the intervenor companies. 90
Less than two months later, on October 18, 2007, the Center for Public
Integrity moved, pursuant to a federal procedural rule, 9' for an alteration or
amendment to the court's original ruling in favor of the FCC.92 The court
noted that motions for reconsideration should only be entertained when
"the moving party shows new facts or clear errors of law which compel the
court to change its prior position. 93 The CPI attempted to introduce new
evidence in the form of a statistical report by one of its own employees,
86. Id. at 115-16.
87. Id. at 116.
88. Id. at 115.
89. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
90. 505 F. Supp. 2d at 117.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(2). For a nonjury trial, this procedural rule allows a court to hear a
motion for a new trial and to take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and consider a new judgment.
92. Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 515 F.Supp.2d 167 (D.D.C.
2007).
93. Id. at 168. Here the court was quoting Nat'l Ctr. for Mfg. Sci. v. Dep't of Def., 199 F.3d
507, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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reinforcing the group's position that the requested information is analogous
to that which could be found in other sources by enterprising consumers.94
The court found that this new evidence merely supported, in a slightly
different form, the same unsuccessful argument from the prior proceeding,
and by precedent this tactic had already been rejected.95 In effect, the CPI
could not explain why its new evidence was not presented in the original
proceeding, or why the new evidence was likely to alter the court's
position. 96 In a previous case, the D.C. District Court had also ruled that
simple disagreement with a prior judgment does not satisfy the criteria
described in the federal rules of procedure for altering or amending that
previous decision.97 For these reasons, the Center for Public Integrity's
motion for reconsideration was denied.98
Thus, on October 18, 2007, the CPI's efforts to pry more specific
broadband deployment information out of the FCC came to an
unceremonious end. The inability to learn whether or not
telecommunications companies were providing realistic information to the
FCC, via Form 477, continued to give consumers reason to doubt the
viability or accuracy of the FCC's broadband availability statistics. There
is also reason to question whether such data should truly be considered
"trade secrets" when it is used by the FCC to compile reports that it then
releases to the public. Most importantly, one must question whether the
commercial benefits of keeping such information secret outweigh the costs
for citizens who use public infrastructure that is developed and managed by
private companies.
IV. Trade Secrets Jurisprudence and Public Infrastructure
Litigation concerning the trade secrets exemption to the Freedom of
Information Act typically raises two important questions. First, is a
government agency justified in withholding information that has been
submitted voluntarily by the parties it regulates, especially when that
information is then used to create reports for public consumption? Second,
can citizens effectively understand infrastructure that has been deployed for
their use and benefit, but by companies that keep information about that
deployment secret?
94. Ctr. For Pub. Integrity, 515 F.Supp.2d at 169. See also supra note 85 and accompanying
text.
95. Pearson v. Thompson, 141 F. Supp. 2d 105, 107 (D.D.C. 2001).
96. Ctr. For Pub. Integrity, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 169.
97. Rann v. Chao, 209 F. Supp. 2d 75, 83 (D.D.C. 2002). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
98. Ctr. For Pub. Integrity, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 170.
20091
These distinctions are imperative for understanding whether potential
competitive harm to broadband providers is truly a sound rationale for the
FCC's non-disclosure of the type of information sought by the Center for
Public Integrity. In particular, how can the FCC claim that the broadband
market is competitive and beneficial for American consumers when it
refuses to disclose information that corroborates such conclusions?
Meanwhile, the 1996 Telecommunications Act requires the FCC to
"encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced
telecommunications capability to all Americans," and to regularly inquire
on whether such deployment is taking place.99 Do such inquiries by the
FCC require statistics from telecommunications firms that can be
independently reviewed and corroborated by citizens?
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet heard a case in which the
definitions or parameters of FOIA Exemption 4 were in dispute. Therefore,
the District of Columbia Circuit has formed the precedents for determining
whether the trade secrets exemption has been used properly or improperly
by a government agency.100 Three precedents are relevant to the present
discussion on the secrecy of broadband statistics-the aforementioned
National Parks decision of 1974,01 the Critical Mass decision of 1992,102
and an obscure 1983 case involving the Food and Drug Administration.
10 3
Only the first of these was considered as precedent in Center for Public
Integrity v. FCC. The court erred in not considering the other two
precedents, because the secrecy of broadband deployment statistics raises
important issues of voluntarily vs. involuntarily submitted information, and
the public's understanding of infrastructure that is deployed for its benefit.
In the text of the Freedom of Information Act, the trade secrets
exemption is the fourth of nine codified exemptions that can be used by
government agencies to withhold requested information. 10 4 The original
rationale for protecting trade secrets was pro-business, as companies should
be encouraged to innovate without worrying that a competitor could make
99. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 §§ 706(a)-706(b)
(1996).
100. See Melissa J. Moser, The Continued Influence of the Critical Mass Decision on
Exemption 4 of the Federal Freedom of Information Act, unpublished paper presented at the
Association for Education in Journalism & Mass Communication, Auburn, Ala, March 15, 2008,
at 24 (on file with author).
101. Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
102. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993).
103. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin., 704 F.2d. 1280
(C.A.D.C. 1983).
104. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2002).
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use of FOIA to usurp the information that they are required to report to the
government. 10 5  Starting in the late 1960s, several cases were brought to
court involving disputes around agency use of FOIA Exemption 4, though
at first the basic meaning of the exemption was rarely a matter under
consideration.
0 6
The first noteworthy case in which the true meaning and ramifications
of the trade secrets exemption were contested was the National Parks case
of 1974. In this proceeding, an environmental advocacy group disagreed
with a refusal by the Department of the Interior, via FOIA Exemption 4, to
disclose licensing documents related to concession stands at national
parks. 10 7  The court lamented the lack of definition for the word
"confidential" in Exemption 4,1°08 and thus formulated what became known
as the National Parks test for the applicability of that term:
[A] commercial or financial matter is 'confidential' for
purposes of the exemption if disclosure of the information is
likely to have either of the following effects: (1) to impair the
Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the
future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive
position of the person from whom the information was
obtained. 109
This test became the norm for Exemption 4 cases throughout the federal
court system, and was applied regularly (and without significant
controversy) for nearly two decades." 0
105. See Charles N. Davis, A Dangerous Precedent: The Influence of Critical Mass III on
Exemption 4 of the Federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 COMM. L. & POL'Y 183, 188 (2000).
Note that trade secrets law, a segment of intellectual property law, contains its own mechanisms
for protecting innovators from theft of their trade secrets by competitors. This body of law
applies primarily to interactions between businesses, while the trade secrets exemption to the
Freedom of Information Act is only relevant in matters of government disclosure of information
that businesses have submitted to agencies. See generally Jon Chally, The Law of Trade Secrets:
Toward a More Efficient Approach, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1269 (2004). See also Kurt M. Saunders,
The Law and Ethics of Trade Secrets: A Case Study, 42 CAL. W. L. REv. 209, 215-228 (2006).
106. See e.g. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796
(D.C.N.Y. 1969); Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578
(C.A.D.C. 1970), Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n., 450 F.2d 698 (C.A.D.C. 1971);
Getman v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 450 F.2d 670 (C.A.D.C. 1971).
107. Nat'l Parks v. Morton, 498 F.2d at 766.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 770.
110. See Moser, supra note 100, at 7.
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Meanwhile, the court in National Parks added an important distinction
to the meaning of "trade secret" by quoting the original senate debates
during the passage of FOIA: "This exception is necessary to protect the
confidentiality of information which is obtained by the Government
through questionnaires or other inquiries, but which would customarily not
be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.""' In
other words, when a party submits information voluntarily to a government
agency, it is not automatically assumed that the same agency should
disclose that information to the public just because it was originally
submitted without compulsion from the government."' This distinction
effectively reinforced the rights of parties that are compelled (though not
necessarily required) to provide information to government agencies' 1-
and this focus on voluntary information would later cause a schism in
Exemption 4 jurisprudence.
The difference between voluntarily and involuntarily submitted
information became a matter of dispute in the Critical Mass case of 1992,
in which the D.C. Circuit Court abruptly formulated a new test to
distinguish between these two categories of government-held
information."l 4 In this proceeding, a citizen's group known as the Critical
Mass Energy Project contested an Exemption 4 non-disclosure by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"). The information in question
was provided voluntarily by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, a
consortium representing companies regulated by the NRC. 1' The NRC
denied Critical Mass's FOIA request, and then requested summary
judgment in the resulting appeal. This motion was granted by the district
111. S. Res. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965). Here the court was quoting earlier cases
that in turn used this quotation from the Senate debates. See Grumman Aircraft Engineering
Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (C.A.D.C. 1970); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Fed. Trade
Comm'n., 450 F.2d 698 (C.A.D.C. 1971). Those cases involved agency withholding of
information under FOIA Exemption 4, though the text of the exemption was not a matter under
consideration.
112. Nat'l Parks v. Morton, 498 F.2d at 766-67.
113. Id. at 769. See also Moser, supra note 100, at 6-7.
114. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993). This case is known informally as Critical Mass III due
to multiple appeals, remands, and summary judgments all related to same FOIA denial by the
NRC. The Critical Mass Energy Project was a now-defunct effort undertaken by Public Citizen,
the consumer rights group founded by Ralph Nader. The project sought to increase the
transparency of government licensing of nuclear power plants. Public Citizen still opposes
unfettered construction of nuclear power plants, but now does so under an endeavor to promote
sustainable energy. See Public Citizen, Energy Program, http://www.citizen.org/cmep/index.cfm
(last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
115. Critical Mass II1, 975 F.2d at 874.
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court under the National Parks test for confidentiality. 1 6 After multiple
appeals and remands," 7 the D.C. Circuit Court resolved to rehear the facts
of the case and reconsider whether the National Parks test was appropriate
for voluntarily submitted information, choosing to "correct some
misunderstandings as to [the] scope and application" of the test.
1 8
Here the court formulated a distinction between voluntary and
involuntary submissions of data to government agencies. In situations in
which information is furnished voluntarily, the government interest is the
continued availability of data. On the other hand, for involuntary
submissions the government interest is the continued reliability of the data.
This distinction between availability and reliability is not found in the
National Parks test. 119 In turn, that test of the meaning of "confidential"
under FOIA Exemption 4 was found to be workable only for data furnished
to the government involuntarily. 20  The court then determined that
voluntarily submitted information was "confidential" for purposes of the
trade secrets exemption "if it is of a kind that would customarily not be
released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained."
'1 21
116. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 644 F. Supp. 344, 346-47
(D.D.C. 1986).
117. Critical Mass's refusal to accept the FOIA denial by the NRC resulted in an extended
and complicated cycle of litigation. In the first appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court ruled that the
district court's judgment was a proper application of the National Parks test. However, the court
also ruled that the NRC had not fully proven that the information in question was submitted
voluntarily, and remanded the case for further findings on that matter. Critical Mass Energy
Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 830 F.2d 278, 281-82 (D.C. Cir. 1987). After remand,
the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted because the
defendants had shown sufficiently that disclosing the requested information would harm the
government's interest in efficiently licensing nuclear power facilities. Critical Mass Energy
Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 731 F. Supp. 554, 557 (D.D.C. 1990). This ruling was
then appealed by Critical Mass, at which time the appeals court remanded the case again for
further findings on the effects of disclosure on the quality of the NRC's licensing operations.
Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 931 F.2d 939, 943-947 (D.C. Cir.
1991). This ruling inspired petitions from the defendants to vacate, which were granted by the
circuit court. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 942 F,2d 799 (D.C.
Cir. 1991). After this ruling, the court resolved to reexamine all the previous decisions and
reconsider the definition of "confidential" under the National Parks test. This was the impetus
for the 1992 proceeding under discussion in the present section of this article.
118. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 875 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).
119. Id. at 878.
120. Id. at 879.
121. Id. at 878-79. Note that this language was borrowed from the National Parks ruling, but
in that ruling the requirement was not applied only to voluntarily submitted information. See
supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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The court finally ruled 7-4 (en banc) not to overturn the National
Parks test because of its longstanding precedent.' 22 However, that test was
now confined to involuntary information only. And while the court did not
state that it was forming a new test for voluntary information, this was
effectively the outcome of the ruling, as courts in future disputes
surrounding FOIA Exemption 4 would have to differentiate voluntary
information from that which is required by government agencies., 23 This
new test was heavily criticized in a rash of unfavorable articles by legal
experts and government transparency advocates. 124  The most telling
criticism of the Critical Mass decision concerns its impact on consumer
advocates and public interest groups, who would find major categories of
previously attainable information falling under the trade secrets exemption,
if the providers or the government agency could claim plausibly that
voluntarily submitted data was not to be released to the public by
,,custom. ,, 125
While not all the federal circuits have accepted the Critical Mass test
uniformly, it has become the norm in Exemption 4 litigation in the circuit
in which the test was formulated-the D.C. Circuit. That circuit is also the
venue for a majority of FOIA related litigation, including the Center for
Public Integrity's suit over broadband statistics, so Critical Mass is
effectively operating as a precedent. 126  Therefore, that test's distinction
between voluntary and involuntary information is crucial to the FOLA
dispute between the CPI and the FCC.
A. Voluntary and Involuntary Information on FCC Form 477
After the Critical Mass decision, it became easier for government
agencies to treat voluntary and involuntary information differently, with
122. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 880.
123. See Moser, supra note 100, at 9.
124. See e.g. Davis, supra note 105; Rocco J. Maffei, The Impact on FOIA after Critical
Mass, 22 PUB. CONT. L.J. 757 (1993); Scott Raber, Reinventing a Less Vigorous Freedom of
Information Act: The Aftermath of Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 1994 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 79 (1994); G. Branch Taylor, The Critical Mass Decision:
A Dangerous Blow to Exemption 4 Litigation, 2 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 133 (1994). See also
Moser, supra notel00, at 9-14.
125. See Rena Steinzor, "Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors ": The Homeland Security
Act and Corporate Accountability, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 641, 653 (2003). Similar concerns
were voiced in the dissent to the Critical Mass III decision, supplied by future Supreme Court
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who called the new test "slackened" and likely to inspire agency
and business abuse of the phrase "customarily not be released to the public." See Critical Mass,
975 F.2d at 883.
126. See Moser, supra notel00, at 15-17. Moser calculates that 60 percent of cases
concerning FOIA Exemption 4 are heard in the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 15.
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involuntary information more likely to be disclosed to FOIA requesters and
voluntary information more likely to be withheld." 7 This phenomenon
appears to have manifested itself with the FCC's broadband statistics, if
those statistics were formulated with information that was submitted
voluntarily by private telecommunications companies. But the court in the
CPI case did not consider this distinction fully, perhaps because the CPI
itself did not consider the possibility that some of the information provided
by telecommunications companies to the FCC was submitted voluntarily.
During the proceedings, all parties in the case (including the CPI)
agreed that the information submitted on FCC Form 477 was involuntary.
Therefore, the National Parks test for confidentiality, now the norm for
involuntary information in the wake of the Critical Mass decision, was
applied by the court. The requested information was henceforth found to be
confidential and eligible for withholding under Exemption 4.128 The court
did not even mention Critical Mass in the ruling, as that test applies to
voluntary information. However, the court did briefly mention-but then
overlooked-a potentially crucial amicus curiae brief filed by the Wireless
Communications Association ("WCA"). 129 In its brief, the WCA noted that
"most Form 477 filings are mandatory" but suggested that "there may also
be some voluntarily filers."' 130  Despite mentioning this possibility, the
WCA stated in its brief that all the information at issue should be treated as
confidential regardless, which the court proceeded to do via the National
Parks test.
131
But the possibility of voluntarily-submitted information on FCC
Form 477 should have inspired the court to consider the Critical Mass
precedent. Recall that in addition to its distinction between voluntary and
involuntary information, the Critical Mass court also drew a distinction
between availability (voluntary) and reliability (involuntary).' 32  For
127. See Stephen R. Wilson, Public Disclosure Policies: Can a Company Still Protect Its
Trade Secrets?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265, 281 (2003).
128. 505 F. Supp. 2d at 112.
129. The Wireless Communications Association is a non-profit trade organization
representing companies in the wireless broadband industry. See Wireless Communications
Association International, About Us, available at http://www.wcai.com/about-us.php (last visited
Feb. 19, 2009).
130. See Answer of Defendant-intervenor Wireless Communications Association
International, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. Fed. Communications Comm'n., No. 06-1644 (RMC),
(D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://projects.publicintegrity.org/docs/telecom/telecomfoia
/15-6_ProposedAnswer.pdf at 8 (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). Emphasis added. This brief
supported the arguments of the FCC, Verizon, and AT&T.
131. Center for Public Integrity, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 112.
132. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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voluntary information, "the presumption is that [the government's] interest
will be threatened by disclosure as the persons whose confidences have
been betrayed will, in all likelihood, refuse further cooperation."'' 33 This
distinction is worth noting when the government-held information at issue
is used in reports tailored for the public. When promoting the possibilities
of broadband availability to the American people, the FCC is dependent
upon the cooperation of telecommunications companies. Therefore the
government's interest, under the above statement by the Critical Mass
court, is to keep incoming information available, not to protect the
competitive sensibilities of the companies supplying it. For the FCC's
broadband statistics, withholding the incoming information is more likely
to threaten the government's interests, not those of the companies, because
the information is being used to further the FCC's goal of educating the
public. This distinct governmental interest was not considered by the court
in the CPI case.
As for the interests of the telecommunications companies, also recall
that the Critical Mass court ruled that voluntarily-submitted information
can be deemed confidential "if it is of a kind that would customarily not be
released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained."
'' 34
Notwithstanding the difficulties surrounding the term "customarily,"1 35 the
court added that "the agency invoking Exemption 4 must meet the burden
of proving the provider's custom."'1 36  Thus, given the possibility of
voluntary information on Form 477, if the court had invoked the Critical
Mass precedent the FCC would have had to prove that withholding the
information from the public was the "custom" of the broadband
companies-a burden of proof that would have to be weighed against the
disclosure requirements of the Freedom Information Act. 1
37
B. The Public Broadband Infrastructure
In addition to the distinction between voluntary and involuntary data,
the court in Center for Public Integrity v. Federal Communications
Commission should have also considered the impact of trade secrets on
public infrastructure (or more precisely, infrastructure that is used by the
public but deployed by private firms) and the accountability of the
government agencies that maintain and promote it. For the FCC and its
133. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878.
134. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
136. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 879, According to the court, this burden corresponds to that
placed on the government in all other types of FOIA disputes. Id.
137. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2002).
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promotion of the supposed competitiveness and availability of the
American broadband market, such promotion requires deployment statistics
that corroborate the FCC's conclusions and which can be reviewed and
validated by consumers and their representatives. 138  Private businesses
now conduct much of the development and management of public
infrastructure, particularly in telecommunications, and such companies are
increasingly using trade secrets jurisprudence to obfuscate activities that
were traditionally performed by government. 139  This reduces the
accountability of the telecommunications firms that are developing the
broadband network, as the commercial profit motive conflicts with
American traditions of government transparency. 
140
Public infrastructure, including the American broadband network, is a
resource that all Americans use or could possibly use. The benefits of
broadband have been heavily promoted as an economic and political boon
for the nation's citizens, as heard in campaign rhetoric dating back to the
2000 presidential election, 141 and George W. Bush's 2004 mandate to
provide access to all Americans. 142 But a fundamental conflict arises when
infrastructure is promoted as beneficial for the citizenry by one segment of
the American government, while another segment keeps information about
the development of that infrastructure secret. 143 The commercial benefits
that secrecy delivers to private telecommunications companies do not
outweigh the potential benefits for consumers who may be able to partake
of broadband offerings. 144  Public use of public infrastructure requires
public knowledge, but allowing company information to be exempted from
disclosure prohibits full understanding of that infrastructure among
138. Recall that the FCC is required to encourage the deployment of advanced
telecommunications services in a reasonable and timely fashion, and to report periodically to
Congress on the status of such deployment efforts. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56 §§ 706(a)-(b) (1996).
139. See David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public
Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REv. 135, 176-77 (2007).
140. See Philip M. Napoli & Michelle Seaton, Necessary Knowledge for Communications
Policy: Information Asymmetries and Commercial Data Access Usage in the Policymaking
Process, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 295, 320-22 (2006).
141. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
143. Government secrecy surrounding the development of public infrastructure is a relatively
recent phenomenon. Historically, other areas of infrastructure development like road construction
have not been especially afflicted by non-transparency. However, the highly technical nature of
telecommunications infrastructure, featuring many patents and heavily guarded research and
development programs, is prone to much more secrecy. The non-transparency of the highly
competitive private firms involved has spilled over into the government agencies that compile
infrastructure information, most notably the FCC. See Levine, supra note139, at 170-71, 174-75.
144. Id. at 151.
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citizens. 145 This raises the important question of who is most affected by
the disclosure of the trade secrets in question. Would the disclosure of
those secrets be truly harmful to the private company, or is withholding the
information more harmful to the American citizen attempting to make use
of the company's product-or in this case, the infrastructure?
In a 1983 FOIA dispute involving the Food and Drug
Administration's testing of intraocular lenses, a district court in the D.C.
Circuit added an important refinement to the definition of "trade secret" as
covered by FOIA Exemption 4: "[a] commercially viable plan, formula,
process, or device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or
processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be the end product
of either innovation or substantial effort., 14 6  This refinement to the
definition of "trade secret," if it had been considered by the court in the CPI
dispute, would have also placed additional burdens on the FCC and the
intervenor companies to show that withholding the requested information
was not just in the companies' interests, but the public's.
The "trade commodities" distinction in that definition would allow the
withholding of information that applies only to devices and technologies
developed by the telecommunications companies (or in other words, their
"commodities"). However, the information sought by the CPI extended
beyond the internal research and development of those companies and into
the public infrastructure. By definition, an infrastructure consists of
patterns of public use and participation that are beyond the mere
commodities that it is built upon. Hence, the public's interest must be
taken into account.
147
The FDA definition of a "trade secret" was not utilized as precedent in
Center for Public Integrity v. Federal Communications Commission. This
was an oversight by the court because the expanded FDA conception of a
trade secret provides crucial distinctions that are relevant to broadband
infrastructure. When something created by private companies-in this
case, America's broadband network-is utilized by the public at large, the
conception of trade secrets should be narrowed to apply only to inter-firm
commerce. In other words, the withholding of trade secrets under FOIA
Exemption 4 should be confined to situations in which the only parties that
145. Id. at 152, 154.
146. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin., 704 F.2d. 1280-81
(C.A.D.C. 1983). Intraocular lenses are implanted in the eye during cataract surgery. This case
involved a FOIA denial by the FDA toward information requested by Public Citizen concerning
the testing of these lenses. Id. at 1282.
147. See Levine, supra note]39, at 141-45.
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could possibly be harmed are one or more private companies. 148 But when
public infrastructure is at issue, relevant information should not be defined
only as "trade secrets" unless disclosure would fundamentally harm the
infrastructure itself. Such considerations would bring the needs of the
public into discussions of whether such information should be disclosed by
the government.
1 49
Therefore, the court in Center for Public Integrity v. Federal
Communications Commission erred in using only the National Parks
standard to determine whether the requested information qualified as "trade
secrets" under FOIA Exemption 4. It should be noted that the Center for
Public Integrity did not consider the Critical Mass or FDA precedents in
any of its motions, filings, or arguments, which would have been in its best
interests. Regardless, the court should have taken these precedents into
account due to the possibility of voluntarily submitted information and the
peculiarities of the public infrastructure. When the information sought by
the CPI was withheld by the FCC, the only beneficiaries were the
telecommunications companies that provide that information, while the
needs of public users of America's broadband infrastructure were not even
considered. The public interest that is at the heart of the Freedom of
Information Act, not to mention the FCC's promotion of the broadband
infrastructure, was incorrectly disregarded by the court, the
telecommunications companies, and most importantly the FCC.
V. Conclusion
On March 19, 2008, the FCC finally announced a plan to overhaul its
methods of measuring the deployment of the American broadband network
and the availability of service to consumers-an overhaul that became
required by law later that year in the Broadband Data Improvement Act.
The commission's technical definition of "broadband" would be
modernized and the pronouncements of availability would be based on
geographic areas more sharply defined than zip codes. 150 At the time of
writing, whether or not such plans will come to fruition remains to be seen,
but perhaps the new measurement methodology will make the FCC's
broadband deployment statistics more believable to commentators and
industry experts. Meanwhile, the knowledge level of the typical American
consumer should be a matter of much more concern to all the parties
involved.
148. Id. at 191-92.
149. Id. at 192.
150. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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Regardless of the strength of the methodology used to create statistics
that are then used for public promotion, there is still the crucial matter of
the incoming information that is used to create those statistics. That
information, as supplied by private telecommunications companies, must
be made transparent if American citizens are to believe what the FCC tells
them about the growth and availability of the broadband network. As this
paper has argued, it is nonsensical for the government to withhold
information that is supplied voluntarily (in part) by private companies, and
then use that same data to create promotional reports that potentially could
be crucial to citizens as they try to understand the state of their public
infrastructure.
When the American citizenry at large is intended as the ultimate
beneficiary of private company information, the interests of the public
should outweigh the fears of competitive harm to the companies providing
the data. When the development of public infrastructure is conducted by
private companies, those firms should realize that they have an incentive, if
not a duty, to accurately inform the public users of that infrastructure.
When they incorrectly contend that the information needed by the public
should be withheld as trade secrets, the private telecommunications
companies risk alienating huge numbers of potential customers. This is a
poor business practice that could be ameliorated by a greater commitment
to public accountability.
151
If private telecommunications companies, and the FCC, want
Americans to believe that broadband is widely available and competitively
priced throughout the land, they should reveal their justifications for
making such pronouncements. When they succeed in keeping such
information under wraps via an incorrect use of the Freedom of
Information Act, the public has been given little reason to believe that the
American broadband network is the success story that the government and
telecommunications companies claim it to be.
151. See Levine, supra note 139, at 191-92.
